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1 . INTRODUCTION 
A leveraged buyout (LBO) is an acquisition of a company, to take it 
private which leaves the a cquired operating entity with a greater than 
traditional debt to worth ratio, or a method of utilizing others' assets 
(in the form of debt or equity) in an effort to produce a 
disproportionate increase in one's own investment and, coincidently, 
overall worth . This paper examines the effect of LBOs on t he target 
firms' securities. 
An LBO involves leveraging (borrowing) from a financin g source to 
acquire the target company . The proceeds are used to pay the seller. 
Internal cash flow and/or assets redeployment are use d to retire the 
debt . An LBO may also signal information about firm's value to 
investors. As a resul t, security price changes associated with an LBO 
can result from several or combination of factors. We attempt to 
identify some of the dominant factors underlying the observed value 
changes. 
An examination of leveraged buyouts provides evidence that has 
implications on several other issues like the effect of altering a firm's 
investment and/or financing decisions, the means by which new i nformation 
is disseminated to investors and the conflict of interest betwe en a 
firm's stockholders and the holders of o ther classes of securities. 
The next section of the paper describes the basic features and 
institutional arrangements of the principal way s in which LBOs a re 
initiated. In s ec tion 3 , explanation of the var ious hypotheses are 
p resen ted . Sec tion 4 describes the sampl e of LBO firms and the p rincipal 
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sources of data. The empirical analysis of the impact of LBOs is 
presented in section 5 and section 6 summarizes the results of this 
investigation. 
2. METHODS OF LEVERAGED BUYOUTS 
An LBO is accomplished primarily by utilizing the purchased assets 
for collateral and the acquired earning stream to amortize the debt. The 
investment goal of an LBO is usually to buy right to a company, leverage 
to the maximum safe limi t, and then resell or go public in three to five 
years with a commensurat e three to five times return on equity invested 
(Garguilo (1982)). 
The terms of purchase are usually all cash or cash and notes to the 
seller . However, the sellers sometimes participate by becoming equity 
owners in the acquiring corporation. The purchaser's capital investment 
us ually represents only a small portion of the purchase price and the 
balance of the purchase price is supplied by third-party lenders or 
equity sources. 
The companies purchased, two to three years ago , were usually 
unde rvalued, slow growing companies in basic manufacturing industries 
where the company's solid assets (e.g. machinery) were used to secure 
debt. But now this structure has completely changed to include h igher 
price/ earnings ratio companies offering lower premiums over the market. 
This has been possible because assets are no longer the primary form of 
collateral and lenders put up money nowadays based on strong management , 
so lid cash f low, and product viabili ty. 
The sellers are large stockholders of companies who sell f or a 
desire for liquidity, estate cons i derations, retirement or sickness, and 
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corpora tions seeking to spin off assets that no longer fit corporate 
product-line strategies or meet the parent's financial criteria of growth 
or return on investment(ROI). The buyers include entrepreneurs, 
incumbent management teams, investors/managers, corporations, and 
investment bankers acting either as agents and/or investors. The 
subordinate lenders are typically venture capital firms and insurance 
companies and the secured lenders are primarily the commercial banks and 
commercial finance companies. 
The ownership structure of the newly private firm is designed both 
to protect the interests of parties that have supplied capital in the 
buyout and to improve the incentives and performance of a management 
group which general ly stays with the company . Mostly being initiated by 
the management group, the method of financing in an LBO depends upon the 
management group's initial equity ownership and collateral available . 
But a large part of financing is provided by some combination of 
subordinate debt--genera lly with an equity kicker--and senior debt--
generally owing to banks aggregating to the total purchase price. The 
structure of credit in an LBO will always fall into one of the f ollowing 
quadrants. 
Type of 
Transaction 
Asset 
Acquisition 
Stock 
Acquisition 
Fi gure 1 
Type of Financing 
Secured Unsecured 
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Secured financing is when the assets of the bought company are used to 
collatralize the debt and unsecured financing consists of a combination 
of venture capital (subordinate and/or senior debt). Asset acquisition 
refers to the formation of a new company to acquire the assets of the 
target company while stock acquisitions may be done in many ways. These 
may include stock redemption, pure stock acquisitions, tender offers and 
reverse mergers. 
Junk bonds are increasingly being used to affect an LBO. Though 
these debt securities with ratings lower than investment grade, are 
hardly a new phenomenon, their recent use has generated a lot of 
criticism. Complaints about the bonds include c h arges that they are 
being used to create excessive leverage in the economy, that they are 
bought for unsound reasons by some of the prominent players in the 
takeover field, and that they threaten large and establ ished companies 
with takeovers by smaller raiders unable to obtain fina ncing from more 
traditional sources. 
Another development in LBOs is the use of Employee Stock Ownersh ip 
Plans (ESOP). In such a ' buyout, the funds are borrowed in the name of 
the ESOP and the ESOP is made to subscribe to an equivalent amount of 
common stock of the new firm. As the ESOP repays the principal plus 
interest on the loan from the tax-deductible contributions ma de to it b y 
the firm it obtains title to the common stock. Thus the ESOP, which 
usually is in the trust and control of management, eventually becomes the 
principal owner of the new f i rm . The employees' risk position 
deteriorates, however, since they have now become seve rely 
underdiversified. The major advantage of ESOP thus being that not only 
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the interest but also the principal payments on the debt become 
deductible from taxable income. This makes ESOP loans more a t tractive to 
bankers. 
3. STATEMENT OF VARIOUS HYPOTHESES AND RELATED EVIDENCE 
3.1 Transaction Costs Hypothesis 
An announcement that a firm is to be acquired and taken private and 
the resulting elimination of costs associated with public ownership 
should produce an increase in the firm's value . The potential percentage 
gains to existing stockholder's by the acquis ition is equal to the 
capitalized cost of public ownership divided by the market value of the 
firm's common stock (DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Rice (DDR) (1984)) 
Assuming that the cost of public owne rship is a fixed cost and is 
independent of firm size , it may b e a rgued that this cost is constant 
across our sample . If this assumption holds, the potential percentage 
gains from a buyout should be lower for larger firms and vice versa 
(Travlos and Millon (1985)). However, Gunay (1985) argues that since the 
LBOs involve a very large sum of money, it appears unlikely that 
transaction costs savings a re a major source of gains in a buyout though 
it is possible for very small firms. These competing propositions can be 
tested by examining the relationship between size of the firm and the 
magnitude of their announcement period abnormal returns. A negative 
re l ation among the two implies that the elimination of transaction costs 
is a major determinant of any abnormal returns found at announcement, but 
a positive or no relationship leads to a conclusion that transaction 
costs reduction is not a dominant factor explaining the abnorma l returns. 
Trav los and Millon (1985) test the transaction cos t hypothesis in the 
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case of LBOs but they rule out the hypothesis as a dominant factor 
motivating firms to go private as no systematic pattern is demonstrated 
by the portfolio returns, i.e. between abnormal returns and market value. 
The test we use in our hypothesis test is done in a similar fashion 
as done by Travlos and Millon (1985) though we have a different sample. 
3.2 Agency Cost Hypothesis 
There are at least two possible sources of reduction in agency costs 
under an LBO. First, the management may be willing to take up investment 
proposals which call for disproportionate effort on their part, as LBO 
facilitates compensation arrangement--allowing them to gain 
disproportionately. Second, LBO may lead to improved efficiency in their 
existing operations (DDR (1984), Travlos & Millon (1985)). Gunay (1985) 
criticizes this view by saying that managerial efficiency could not be 
improved so much in LBO offers such that the firms' values increase 
overnight. 
DDR (1984) in their paper on LBOs come up with some support from the 
data for this hypothesized effect. They argue that agency costs of debt 
financing are reduced because third party equity investors have long t erm 
relationships with institutional lenders . Consequently, new equity 
owners hav e reduced incentives to transfer wealth from leaders, which 
encourages additional borrowing and thus provides the indirect benefit of 
a greater tax shield. Their data provides some support for the 
hypothes is (though data was available for only 5 LBO f irms). For these , 
they observed the median debt to assets ratio to i ncreas e rapidly from 
pre to post offer dates. 
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A potentially better test of the above hypothesis on announcement 
period returns would require data on fractional ownership by insider 
stockholders before LBO. Smaller the fractiona l ownership by the 
management before the LBO greater the potential for reduction in agency 
cost after an LBO. Thus a significantly negative relationship between 
pre LBO proportional ownership by the management and the event period 
residuals will be an evidence in favor of the Agency Cost Hypothesis. A 
negative or insignificant relationship will not be consistent with the 
Agency Cost Hypothesis. We do not carry out this analysis due to the 
lack of resources to collect the needed data. 
3.3 Tax Shield Hypothesis 
Another possible source of gain from the LBO may be related to the 
increase in debt held by the firm which goes private. As mentioned by 
Masulis (1980) the large increase in debt increases the firm's tax shield 
which should, in turn, increase the value of the firm by an amount equal 
to the capitalized tax shield multiplied by the corporate tax rate . In 
the case of exchange offers, this has been analyzed extensively by 
Masulis (1980, 1983) who concludes that abnormal returns experienced wi th 
exchange offers are at least partly due to the change in tax shields . 
Travlos and Millon (1985) have examined the hypothesis in the case 
of LBOs by testing the relationship between change in capital structure 
and announcement period abnormal returns, a s imilar procedure to that of 
Masulis '. A positive relationship between abnormal returns and increase 
in debt could l ead to a conclusion that part of abnormal returns is due 
to tax shields from new debt. The data in the sample studied by Travlos 
and Millon (1985) failed to establish a positive relationship and they 
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conclude that announcement period abnormal returns a re not related to the 
firm's expected increase in debt. The unava ilability of resources to 
gather complete da ta on capital structure changes during an LBO kept us 
from performing the test of this hypothesis. 
3 . 4 Senior Security Holders Wealth Expropriation Hypothesis 
If protective covenants of one or more classes of senior security 
holders failed to strictly preclude increase in the amount of senior 
security of equal or senior standing, these senior security holders can 
suffer losses if there is an unanticipated new issue of senior security 
of equal or senior standing. At the same time, the common stockholders 
gain since the market requires lower rate of return on newly issued 
senior securities than it would have if newly issued senior securities 
were subordinated to existing senior securities (Masulis (1978)) . 
Masulis (1980) finds that when an exchange offer is announced which 
increases leverage, announcement period return for non-convertible senior 
securities with incomplete protective covenants is significantly 
negative. This supports the senior security holders wealth expropriation 
hypothesis. In this study we investigate LBO announcement period returns 
for senior securities using a procedure similar to the one used by 
Masulis . We are not aware of any study which has attempted to analyze 
senior security returns related to LBOs. 
3.5 Gains Sharing Hypothesis 
The real resource gains experienced when affecting a LBO due to t he 
reasons mentioned in four hypotheses above may not by itself imply that 
public stockholders benefit but there are poss ible reasons to believe 
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that they (public stockholders) do share in these gains. For instance in 
a perfectly competitive battle for corporate control, any gains from an 
LBO would be shared by stockholders. While the perfect competition 
condition is not satisfied where management already owns a major share in 
the corporation (as is generally the case when a LBO is initiated), the 
inside management's strong position will deter outside teams from bearing 
the costs to take the firm private. Also, if the inside management has a 
strict advantage over outside management, the perfect competition 
conditions are not met . Nevertheless, minority stockholders can be 
expected to share in the gains from going private. The reason that 
minority stockholders should gain is that they have rights that make 
their cooperation necessary to take the firm private through LBO . These 
rights are (1) the right to block a transaction through minority 
stockholder veto and (2) the right to challenge a transaction through 
private litigation.l 
The gains sharing hypothesis could be supported if we observe 
significant positive abnormal common stock returns due to LBO 
announcement.2 The gains sharing hypothesis would be refuted if we 
observed no change or a decrease in public stockholder wealth (or 
abnormal returns) when the proposal for an LBO is announced. 
DDR (1984) tested this hypothesis and observed significant average 
wealth increases for common stockholders due to LBO announcements. Their 
evidence is consistent with the gains-sharing argument. 
l For more details see DDR (1984) pp. 374-375. 
2Tests of the f irst three hypotheses and to some extent the four t h 
hypothes is i s predicated on this being true. 
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4 . METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Data Description 
The initial search yielded 53 firms involved in leveraged buyout 
transactions between the period of June 1982 and June 1985. Forty-five 
of these firms were selected from a listing of the 100 larges t 
acquisitions or LBOs (in dollars) as listed in Mergers and Acquisitions 
for the period June 1982 and June 1985. Eight additional companies were 
identified through a search of The Wall Street Journal Index, fo r the 
same period, and from Moody's Industrials firm indexes. The public 
announcement dates of the proposed buyouts were identified and were taken 
to be the date when the offe r was first published in The Wall Street 
Journal . 3 
The market value of each transaction was obtained from Mergers and 
Acquisition and The Wall Street Journal article announcing the 
transaction. The values for total assets, long t erm debt, and current 
liabilities before and after the buyout (wherever available) were 
obtained from the Moody's Monthly Bond Guides and Stock Guides. 
4.2 Sample Construction 
The following sample selection criteria were imposed on each company 
f or inclusion in the sample for common stock a nalysis in order to have a 
good and reliable data for analys is . 
3The average time passing between the initial announcement date 
(when the buyout was first announce d) and the effective date (when the 
buyout was actua lly completed) was 3.22 months in our sample, with 6.3 
months as the longest period and 1.8 months as the shortest. 
1. They had a determinate announcement date. Four companies did 
not satisfy this criterion and were thus excluded from the 
sample. 
2. They were listed on the New York Stock Exchange or the American 
Stock Exchange at the time of the announcement of the proposal. 
Ten companies did not satisfy this criterion and were thus 
excluded from the sample. 
3. They had experienced no other major event involving capital 
structure changes during and around (ten days prior and after) 
the announcement. Three companies did not satisfy this 
criterion and were thus excluded from the sample. 
4 . The buyout was successfully completed. Four companies did not 
satisfy this criterion and were thus excluded from the sample. 
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5. The buyout was successfully completed for the company as a whole 
and not certain parts or units of it. Three companies did not 
s a tisfy this criterion and were thus excluded from the s a mple. 
6. The daily returns data on the firm's common stock was available 
on the CRSP daily returns tape, for the period surrounding (300 
days before to 10 days after) the announcement date. 
After the screening, 29 offers were f ound to satisfy all six 
criteria . Their major characteristics are summarized in Appe ndix A. The 
list of compa nie s with their names , announcement dates, and delisting 
dates appears in Appendix B. 
The inclusion of companies in senior security analysis face the 
following selection criteria: 
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1. The company had that particular kind of senior security trading 
in the 22 days surrounding the announcement date (11 days before 
and 10 days after) of the LBO for at leas t two days. 
2. The senior securities are traded on the New York Stock Exchange 
or the American Stock Exchange. 
3. The buyout was successfully completed for the company as a whole 
and not certain parts or units of it . 
After the screening, straight bonds of 11 companies, convertible 
bonds of 2 companies, straight preferred stocks of 3 companies, and 
convertible preferred stocks of 2 companies were found to satisfy the 
above criteria. Analysis of Convertible Bond, Straight Preferred, and 
Convertible Preferred Stock was not carried out because of the lack of 
sufficient number of companies satisfying the criteria. 
4.3 Analysis of Common Stocks 
4.3.1 Measuring Abnormal Return. In order to assess the impact of 
new informa tion on an event on security prices we use the daily Marke t 
Model Residuals.3 
A 
ejt - Rjt - aj - bj Rmt 
where 
ejt abnormal return of security j on day t. 
Rjt actual return on stock j on day t. 
3While some doubts were raised by Brown and Warner (1980) , Masulis 
(1980) and Dann (1981) about this procedure, Bro~m & Warner (1985) show 
that a simple methodology based on the market model is both 
well-specified and relatively powerful under a wide variety of conditions 
and in special cases even simpler methods also perform well. 
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the market model parameter estimates for stock j using a 
250 day estimation period starting from event day -300 to -
51. The coefficients estimated above are used to compute the 
abnormal daily returns during the time interval -SO to +10 . 
This period is excluded in estimating the coefficients to 
avoid any bias due to announcement of an event . 4 
Rrot = equally weighted return on the market, obtained from the CRSP 
tapes . 
t = the event day measur ed relative to the first announcement 
date. 
A 
The average abnormal return or prediction error (e) of all the firms 
in the sample is given by 
A 
t 
1 
N 
where N is the number of fi r ms for which the daily returns exis t on day t 
(29 in our study). 
The average cumulative abnor mal r eturns CA is defined as 
where 
the cumulat e d average r es idual from event day t1 t h rough 
4For any s t ock whi ch h ad miss ing re turns dur ing thi s per iod, re t urn 
for a mi ss ing day was calculated as the geometric mean rate of return. 
Most of the miss ing returns we r e on day -1 or 0, possibly because 6f 
suspens ion of trading due to t h e announcemen t of the LBO . 
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4.3.2 Calculation of the Test Statistic5 . The null hypothesis to be 
tested is that the mean day -1 and 0 excess return is equal to 0. The 
test statistic for any event day t is 
T = 
" The standard deviation S (At) is measured as follows6 
t-+51 /59 s (At) L: <At - A) t=-llO 
where 
_l_ t~-51 A 60 L: At t=-llO 
The significance of the cumulative average residuals over days t1, 
t2, is tested as follows: 
T = 
where 
S (CA t1t2) = Standard de'viation of CA t1t2 after adjusting for 
first three autocorrelations of At . 7 
We also calculate the proportion of securities with positive 
residuals for common stocks. The sign test is performed on these 
proportions. It tells us if the proportion securities with pos itive 
SThe approach used is similar to that used by Brown and Warner 
(1985). 
6Assuming that average prediction errors are normal , stationary, and 
independent over time. 
7For details see Gupta (1985) . 
abnormal performance are different from .5. The test statistic is as 
follows . 
where 
Zt is 
N is 
Mt is 
for 
2 (Mt + .5 - .5 X N) 
zt 
normally distributed 
the number of securities in the sample 
the number of securities with positive 
event day t. 
4.4. Straight Debt Analysis 
abnorma l performance 
Due to the lack of availability of electronically readable data for 
bonds, the procedure used for analyzing bonds is quite different from 
that used for common stocks. The procedure we use is identical to the 
procedure 3 in Appendix B of Dann (1980). We analyze daily bond r eturns 
from 11 days before announcement through 10 days after announcement of a 
buyout offer . 
For each event day rate of return is calculated for securities 
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trading on that day, by dividing the price for that day by the price fo r 
previous trading day if any and t hen subtracting l from the ratio. 8 If a 
security had no previous bond trading within the study period (-11 to +10 
event days) its return is equal to zero for that day. Similarly if a 
security did not trade on a given day its return is also equal to zero. 
8No attempt >·Tas made to take accrued interest into 
given day its affect will be quite small. For example: 
paying 15% annual coupon , accrued interest will account 
return per day . Moreover since we are using comparison 
it will cancel out an'F-1ay. 
account as on any 
for a securi ty 
for only 0.04% 
period approach 
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Under this procedure r~te of return for a security following a non 
trading day is a multiple day rate of return . 9 We then calculate equally 
weighted average return for each event (company) having more than one 
security included in the sample. These average returns for each event 
are then averaged across events for each event day (-11 to +10). This 
procedure allows us to equally weight each event rather than each 
security. 
Unlike common stocks, many of the debt issues trade infrequently. 
This poses potential difficulties for the measurement of the impact of 
the tender offer announcement and interpretation of the time series of 
average returns. If there is a lag between the announcement date and the 
date of the next trade, then for securities not trading on the 
announcement day, the impact of the tender offer will be observed in the 
next reported price. We, therefore, also calculate the initial post 
announcement (IPA) percentage rate of return for each security. 
Under this procedure, IPA rate of return is calculated by div iding 
the first available trading price of bond on or after the announcement 
day by the first available price for that security before the event day 
and then subtracting 1 from the ratio . We then first calculate the 
equally weighted average of IPA for each event and then average them 
across events. 
4.4.1 Calculation of the Tes t Statistic . To test the significance 
of announcement day r esiduals we use comparison period approach similar 
to Masulis (1980). Using that approach we calculate the announcement day 
!-statistics for bonds as follows: 
9on an average, instances in which no trade i s reported on a day 
occurs 38% of the t i me f or this sample of securities. 
S 2 + (N -1) · 
a c 
N - 2 
c 
where ~a and Rpc are the respective announcement period and comparison 
period mean daily residuals, sa2 and sc2 are the respective sample 
variances of the announcement period and comparison period daily 
residuals, and Na and Nc are the respective number of daily portfolio 
returns in the announcement period and comparison period samples. 
The sample variances are calculated from the time series of average 
daily returns for debt for the comparison and the announcement periods. 
Defining day -11 to -2 as the comparison period and day -1 and 0 as 
the announcement period, the t-test for significance is performed. The 
null hypotheses to be tested is that the mean announcement period return 
is not significantly different from the mean comparison period portfolio 
return . Same equation is used for testing IPA also, but since we have 
only one day average return we have Na- 1 and Sa- 0. 
4.5 Test of Transaction Cost Hypothesis 
The procedure used to test the transaction cost hypothesis i nvolves 
running a regression between announcement day(s) abnormal returns for 
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common stocks and the market value of the buyout. A significant negative 
correlation would suggest that reduc tion of transaction c osts associated 
with public ownership of a company is a source of abnormal returns. 
18 
5 . EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1 Behavior of the Residuals for Common Stock 
In Table 1, column 1 identifies the trading day relative to day 0 
(the announcement day), column 2 presents the Abnormal Percentage Returns 
on that day, column 3 presents the t-statistic of the return on each day, 
column 4 the proportion of returns greater than zero on that day, column 
5 the z-statistic of the proportions, column 6 the average percentage 
stock returns and column 7 the average percentage market return on a 
particular event day . 
The day -1 abnormal return for the sample is 4.652 % and the day 0 
return is 3.295%.10 The announcement period sum of abnormal returns is 
7.947% (Table 2). The associated t-statistic is 13.97 which indica tes a 
significantly positive average return at any conventional level of 
statistical significance. Looking at the Z statistic test of the 
proportions we see they are significant with the proportions of residuals 
greater than zero being 79.3% and 82.8 % for day - 1 and day 0 respectively 
and 86.2% for two days combined. Table 3 shows the cumulative average 
residuals from day -50 to +10 and the accompanying stat istics similar to 
Table 1. Observing Table 3 alo~g with Figure 2 (plot of CAR over days 
-50 to +10) , we see a possible leakage of informa tion about the LBO 48 
days before the announcement.ll From day -48 to day +1, one could have 
lOThis timing pattern is not unexpected as we are taking date of 
publication of announcement in The Wall Street Journal as the 
announcement date. If the LBO is announced before the close of trading 
in the exchanges, the previous day affect should be observed on day -1 
otherwise i t should be observed in day 0. 
11 We would infer possible leakages in the market about the 
acquisit ion offer--either through the financing companies or banks or the 
management/group. 
earned a cumulative average residual of 27.64%. These results are 
consistent with the gains sharing hypothesis that stockholders benefit 
from the announcement of the LBO. 
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DDR (1984) found the event period abnormal returns to be 16.99% with 
a t-statistic of 20.66, in a sample of 23 leveraged buyouts over the 
period 1973-1980. Travlos & Millon (1985) in their study of LBOs found 
day -1 and 0 return of 7.69% and 7.36% respectively in a sample of 61 
Leveraged Buyouts in the period 1975-1983. It was significant with t 
statistics of 23 . 73 and 27.34 for day -1 and day 0 respectively. Gunay 
(1985) in his sample of 110 firms over the period 1979-1984 observes day 
-1 and 0 returns of 10.12% and 7.12% both being significant with t=36.45 
and 9 . 43 respectively . 
The difference in the event period abnormal returns between our 
study and those mentioned above can be attributed to a different sample 
over a different time period. Another possible reason could be that the 
market has become better at anticipating LBOs, due to leakages in 
information. This is supported by the fact that the CARs i n our study 
are similar to those observed by the other studies mentioned above. 
DDR (1984) report a 27.03% CAR over the period day -40 to 0 , this is 
quite similar to 25.55% CAR for our study over the same period. CAR of 
18.12% is observed over days -15 to 0 by Travlos & Millon (1985), in 
comparison we report 13.84% CAR for the same period. Gunay (1985) 
observes 25.66% CAR over the event period -50 to 0 which is very similar 
to CAR of 27 . 25% for our study over the same period. 
The post announcement CARs are sho~vn in Table 4 and they are not 
statistically significant. This result along with the plot of CAR in 
Figure 2 suggests that the market is efficient with respect to LBO 
announcement as the GARs are fairly constant after the buyout is 
announced and on the average an individual will not be able to make 
profit from an LBO announcement. 
Figure 3 shows the plots of raw Cumulativ e Average Stock Returns 
(GASR) for stocks in our sample and the Cumulative Average Market Return 
(CAMR) on days -50 to +10. This plot further strengthens our argument 
and indicates that abnormal returns are not likely to be sensitive to 
model s pecification. 
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As a test for the transaction cost hypothesis we r u n a regression 
between the sum of average residuals (SAR) over day -1 and day 0 and the 
total market value of the company (Table 5). The beta for this 
regression is -0.014 which indicates for each ten million increase in the 
value of a company SAR declines by 0.014% . However the beta is not 
statistica lly significant. The correlation coefficient, though negative 
(-0.081), is not significant either . Thus, the evidence a t best is very 
weak in favor of transactions cost-hypothesis. This evidence is very 
similar to that obtained by Travlos and Millon ( 1985). 
5.2 Behavior of Raw Returns for Straight Bonds 
Table 6 presents the raw returns on straight bonds over a 22 day 
p e riod f or 11 companies involving 26 d i fferent securities. The analysis 
of returns focuses on t h e imme d iate vicinity o f the buyout. Since only 
11 of the original 63 buyout offer announcements are represented in the 
s a mple of debt analysis, the analysis is based on a much smaller sample 
than t h at of common stock returns. 
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We see large negative returns for days -1 and 0. These returns add 
up to approximately - 0.80% . We carry out a t-test on average returns for 
day -1 and 0 using average returns for days -11 to -2 as the comparison 
period. The t-test yields t--3.27 which is significantly negative. 
Complete details for this can be seen in Table 6. The Initial Post 
Announcement (IPA) Returns for these 11 securities is -1.692% with 
t--10.26. Table 7 shows the CAR for these 11 securities. The CAR over 
the period day -1 to 4 is equal to -2.39% (o=0 . 1789, comparison 
t-statistic--5.07) . Due to non trading of bonds and also because of the 
way we have calculated bond returns, where a security not trading on a 
given day is given a zero return for that day, this cumulative residual 
along with the IPA returns probably reflects the effect of an LBO on 
bondholders better than the announcement day average residuals. Both IPA 
and CAR over day -1 to 4 are larger in magnitude than we have seen in any 
other study. (Both are statistically significant also). 
Figure 4 plots the CAR from day -11 to day 10 for straight bonds . 
The steep decline from day -1 to day +1 gives us an indication of the 
loss to bondholders . This loss is not due to the fall in the market a s 
is clear from Figure 5 showing the CAR and CAMR (cumulative market 
return). 
The evidence of negative returns therefor e indicates that wh en an 
LBO is announc ed , the bondholders of the target company suffer 
s i gnificant l osses . This evidence along with the evidence pr ov ided i n 
the previous section seems to indicate that part of the benefits to 
common stockholders of the target company come a t the expense of 
b ondholders o f t he targe t c ompany when an LBO i s announced. To further 
confirm or refute the evidence we calculate a cross -sectional regression 
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b e tween sum of raw returns over period -1,0 for bonds and common stocks 
for the 7 matched securities (Table 10).12 The beta is found to be equal 
to -0.170 which indicates that for every 1% positive return for 
stockholders, bondholders lose 0.17 %. The beta however is not 
significant . We find the correlation coefficient to be -0.513. Although 
it is not statistically significant at 5% level (possibly because of the 
small sample size), it is the strongest evidence we have seen in favor of 
the wealth transfer hypothesis.l3 
Masulis (1980) in his study of exchange offers finds event period 
(day -1,0) average return of -0.84% with at-statistic of -2.7 for 
non-convertible bonds with incomplete protective covenants . Our results 
are similar, although we are not sure if he used a procedure similar to 
our procedure for calculating average bond returns. The procedure that 
we used probably underestimates the event period (days -1 and 0) returns 
in magnitude as we subsitute zero for any missing returns and include 
them in averaging. IPA and CAR which were quite l arge as reported above 
(-1.69% and -2.39% respectively) probably reflect the affect of LBO on 
bondholders more correctly . These results along with large negative 
cross correlation (-0.51) everi though it is insignificant due to small 
sample size is the strongest evidence we have seen in favor of the wealth 
transfer hypothesis. 
12Tables 8 and 9 show the AR's and CAR's for the 7 matched 
securities which had both bond returns available for the announcement 
period . The evidence is similar to tha t for 11 securities. 
13The cross correlation between IPA fo r bonds and day - 1 ,0 CAR for 
stocks was surprisingly positive (0.08 9 ) but statistically insignificant 
(Table 11). 
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6. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the effects on security 
holders when a proposal to buy a firm is announced through a leveraged 
buyout. Evidence indicates that the stockholders experience gains while 
bondholders experience a loss due to the announcement. The overall 
positive abnormal returns for common stocks support the gains sharing 
hypothesis. Possible source of gains from LBOs may be from a combination 
of reduction of transaction and agency costs, saving in taxes due to 
increased tax shield, and expropriation of bondholders wealth. We did 
not attempt to test the agency costs and tax shield hypothesis. 
Transaction cost hypothesis is not confirme d by the evidence. The 
evidence is quite strong in favor of bondholders wealth expropriation 
hypothesis, however, it does not explain all of the positive abnormal 
returns accruing to the stockholders. 
The evidence seems to indicate that while minority shareholders may 
not need to be protected against LBOs they receive at least p ar t of the 
gains associated with LBOs. At the same time bondholders should 
carefully examine the indenture agreement before buying bonds so that 
they may not suffer unexpected losses if management decides to go private 
by leveraging the firm. It may be worth mentioning here that average 
beta for the firms involved in LBOs was 0.902 which seems to indicate 
that firms involved in LBOs are the ones which h ave less than average 
market risk. Thus bondholders who may h ave thought that they a re 
investing in low risk firms are probably surprised when that firm decides 
to go private using the LBO technique. 
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TABL E 1 
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SUM OVER 
TABLE 2 
SUM OF AVERAGE RESIDUALS FOR COMMON STOCKS AROUND LBO ANNOUNCEMENT 
USING THE MARKET MODEL-I 
27 
DAY TO D~Y SAR IN % STC DEV IN % T-STAT OF PROP>O Z-STAT SAR STK IN % SAR MKT IN % 
- 1 c 7.947 0 . 569 13 . 97• 118 0 . 8€2 3.90* 7.991 0 . 183 
NOTES : 
1. • INDICATES THAT TEST STATISTIC IS SIGNIFICANT AT 5~ LEVEL. USING ONE TAI L TEST . 
2 . •• INDICATES THAT TEST STATISTIC !S SIGNIFICANT AT 5% LEVEL USING TWO TAILS TEST . 
3. ~ INDICATES THAT TEST ST ATTISTIC IS SIGNIFICANT AT 5% LEVE L USING TWO TAILS TEST BUT 
WITH THE WRONG SIGN . 
4 . DF REFERS TO DEGREES OF FREEDOM OFT-STAT. 
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TABL E 3 
CUMULAT I VE AVERAGE RESIDUALS FOR COMMON STOCKS AROUND LBO ANNOUNCEMENT 
USING THE MARKET MOOEL · I 
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- 1 2:: . 95 7 2 .630 9 . 11 ". 2950 0 . 93 1 J . 64 • • 26 .608 2 .016 
c 27 .~52 2. 656 10 . 26 •• 3009 0.931 4 .64•• 29 . 864 2. 093 
27 . 430 2 .68 :1 10 . ~J - · 3068 0.93 1 .:S . 6.J•• 30 .095 2 . 192 
27 . 0 6 5 2 . 707 IO .OO· · 3127 0 . 897 4 . 27 •. 25 . 935 2 .299 
27 . 30~ :1 .733 10 ."0 1" " 3186 0 .857 4. 27 • • 30. 180 2 .229 
2 7 66C ::.757 10 .03 "" 3245 0 . 857 4 . 27 •• 30. olC4 2.250 
5 27 . 420 2 .78: 8 . 86 •• 3300 0.857 J .27 • • 30 168 2. 394 
6 27 . 03 1 2 . 807 9 . 84 •• 3 363 C .897 ..: . 2 7 - .. 30. 200 2. 240 
27 . 762 2. 831 9 . 81 " " 34:2 0.8~7 4 . 27 • • 30 . 421 2 . 303 
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AUT01• ·0 . 126 AUT02• 0 . 057 AUT03• - 0. 061 
NOTE S : 
1 . ! ND !CATES THAT TEST STATISTIC IS SIGNIFICANT AT 5 ' · 
" 
LEV EL US I NG ONE TAIL TEST . 
2. .. INDICATES THU TEST STATISTIC IS SIGN! F!CANT AT 5 \1 LEVEL USING TWO TAI LS TE ST . 
3 . . ! NO! CAT ES THAT TE ST STA TT I STIC IS S IGNIFICANT AT s·· 
" 
LEVEL USI NG TWO TAILS TE ST BUT 
WITH THE WRONG S IGN . 
4 . OF REFE~S TO DEGREES OF FREEDOM OF T·STAT . 
5 . ACCUMLATI DN OF ~VERAGE RESIDUALS BEGINS ON THE F!RSi DATE IN TH~ TAB LE. 
6. AUT01 TO AUT03 REOQESENT AUTOCCRRELAT!ONS OF AVERAGC: RESiDUALS W!TH LAG1 TO LAG3 . 
DAY 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
NOTES: 
TABLE 4 
POST ANNOUNC EMENT CUMULATIVE AVERAGE RESIDUALS FOR COMMON STOCKS AROUND 
LBO ANNOUNCEMENT US ING THE MARKET MODEL-I 
CAR IN " STD . OEV. IN % T-STAT DF PROP>O Z-STAT CAR STK IN 
" 
0. 178 0 . 430 0 . ..: 1 5 9 0.552 0 . 56 0 . 231 
-0 . 187 0. 569 -0 .33 118 0.414 - 0 .93 0 . 071 
0. 110 0.695 0. 16 177 0. 5 17 0. 19 0 . 317 
0. 408 0.787 0.52 236 0.345 - 1 . 6"7 0 .538 
~ . ~69 0 . 870 0.19 295 0.414 -0.93 0 .304 
0 . 379 0. 945 0.40 354 0.448 -~ . 56 0. 337 
0 . 5 10 1 . 015 0. so 413 0 . 448 -0 . 56 0 . 557 
0 . 391 1 .08 1 0 . 3 6 472 0 . 483 -o . 19 0 . 426 
0 . 369 1 . 142 0 . 32 531 0 . 448 -0.56 0 . 518 
0 . 520 1 . 20~ 0 .43 590 0 . 483 -0. 19 0. 759 
% CAR MKI 
0 . 099 
0 . 206 
0. 136 
0 . 157 
0 . 30 1 
0 . 14 7 
0.21 0 
0 . 260 
0.336 
0 . 319 
1. • INDICATES THAT TES7 STATISTIC IS SIGNI FIC ANT AT 5% LEVEL USING ONE TAIL TEST . 
2 . •• INDICATES THAT TEST STAT I S7 IC IS SIGN IFICANT AT 5% LEVEL USI NG TWO TAI LS TEST . 
3 . • INDiCATES THA T TEST STATT!STIC I S SIGNIFICANT AT 5% LEVEL USING TWO TAILS TEST BUT 
W T~ THE WRONG SIGN. 
~ . D REFERS TO DE GRE ES OF FREEDOM OF T-STAT . 
5. A CU~~LATION OF AV ERAGE RE SIDUA LS BEGINS ON THE FIRST DATE IN THE TABLE . 
29 
IN " 
" 
SUM OVER 
DAY TO DAY ALPHA IN % 
- 1 0 8.749 
T-STAT ( 3.38H) ( 
OF 27 
NOTES: 
BETA 
TABLE 5 
REGRESSION BETWEEN SUM OF AVERAGE RESIDUALS AROUND LBO ANNOlJNCE MENT AND 
TOTAL MARKET VALUE OFTHE COMPANY 
USING THE MARKET MODEL-I 
CORRELATION 
COEFFICIENT SST IN %% SSR IN %% SSE IN 'Y.% MSSR IN %% MSSE IN %% 
-0.014 -0 . 081 2414.731 15.658 2399.073 15.658 88.855 
-0.42 ) ( -0 . 42 
?.7 27 28 1 27 
-,-.-. INDICATES THAT lEST STATISTIC IS SIGNIFICANT AT 5% LEVEL, USING ONE TAIL TEST . 
2. •• INDICATES THAT TEST STATISTIC IS SIGNIFICANT AT 5% LEVEL USING TWO TAILS TEST. 
F-STAT 
0.18 
( 1 , 27) 
3. H INDICATES THAT TEST STATTISTIC IS SIGNIFICANT AT 5% LEVEL USING TWO TAILS TEST BUT WITH TliE WRONG SIGN . 
4. OF REFERS TO DEGREE S OFT-STAT OR F-STAT. 
5 . X REF ERS TO THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES WHICH IS TOTAL MARKET VALUE OF THE COMPANY 
AVE RAGE X IN TE N 
MILLION DOLLARS 
57.2620 
w 
0 
TABLE 6 
AVERAGE RESIDUALS FOR UNMATCHED STRAIGHT BONDS AROUND 
LBO ANNOUNCEMENT USING THE RAW RET MODEL 
DAY AV RESID(%) PROP>O Z-STAT AV SEC RET IN % AV MKT RET IN % 
- 1 ~ 0.000 
-10 -0.037 
-9 -0. 108 
-E 0.325 
-7 -0. 105 
-6 0 . 000 
-5 0.001 
-4 -0.021 
-3 0 . 015 
-2 0 . 34 6 
- 1 -0.2 12 
0 -0 . 5 8 8 
-0 .613 
2 -0 .328 
3 -0.440 
4 -0.20 7 
5 0.36 3 
6 -0 . 0 0 1 
i 0 . 2 49 
6 0 . 092 
9 0 . 065 
10 -0.308 
COMPAR!SON 
PERIOD 
EVENT PERIOD 
!Pt. 
0.000 
o .ooo 
0.000 
o. 273 
0.000 
0.091 
0 . 091 
0.091 
0.182 
0. 364 
0.182 
0 . 000 
0 . 182 
0. 182 
0 .091 
0.182 
0. 364 
0 . ~82 
0.273 
0.182 
0.182 
0.091 
AVERAGE 
0 . 041 
-o . 400 
-1 0 692 
" OF EVENTS 1 1 
~: 
-3 .32~ 
-3 . 32• 
-3 . 32• 
- 1 0 51 
-3.32• 
-2 .7 1" 
-2 .7 1" 
-2 . 71" 
-2 . 1 1" 
- 0 . 9 0 
-2 . 11" 
- 3 . 32• 
-2. 1 1•. 
-2 0 11•-
-2.7~--,.. 
-2 . 1 1 •• 
-0 . 90 
-2 . 11 •• 
- 1. 51 
-2 . 11 •.: 
-2. 1 1 •• 
-2.71•• 
0 . 000 
-0 . 037 
-0 . 108 
0.325 
- 0 . 105 
0 .000 
0 . 001 
-0 . 021 
0. 0 15 
0 . 346 
-0.212 
- 0.588 
-0.613 
-0 .328 
-0 . 440 
-0 . 207 
o . 363 
- 0 . 001 
0 . 249 
0 . 092 
0 . 065 
-0 . 308 
STANDARD DEVIATION 
0 . 161 
0.266 
0.0 
" OF SEC = 26 
N 
10 
2 
- 0 . 133 
0.207 
0 . 1 95 
0. 165 
0. 149 
- 0. 118 
0. 132 
0 . 177 
0 .4-'1 
0 . 244 
0 0 166 
0 . 023 
0. 0::24 
0 .286 
0. 042 
- 0. 098 
0 . 20 6 
0 . 121 
0 . 222 
0 . 222 
0 . 260 
0.261 
T-STAT 
- 3.27• 
-1 0 .26 ~ 
31 
1. • INDICATES THAT TEST STATISTIC IS SIGNIFICANT AT 5% LEVE L US !NG ONE TAI L TEST . 
2 . •• INDICATES THAT TEST STATIST I C IS SIGNIFICANT AT 5% LEV EL US I NG TWO TA ILS TEST. 
~- ~ INDICATES THAT TEST STATT I ST I C IS SIGNIFICANT AT 5% LEVEL USI NG TWO TAILS TEST 
6UT WITH THE WRONG SIGN . 
4 DF REFERS TO DEGREES OF FREEDOM OFT -STAT. 
5. N REFERS TO TOTAL NUMBER OF SECURITIES EXPER IENCING THE EVENT. 
TABLE 7 
CUMULATIVE AVERAGE RESIDUALS FOR UNMATCHED STRAIGHT BONDS AROUND 
ANNOUNCEMENT USING THE RAW RET MODEL 
DAY CAR IN " PROP>O Z-STAT CAR SEC IN % CAR MKT IN " /0 
" 
- 11 0.000 0.000 -3 . 32·· 0 . 000 -c. 133 
-10 -0.037 0.000 -3.32·~ -0 . 037 0.074 
-9 -0. 146 0.000 -3.32•• -0 . 146 0.269 
-8 0.180 0.182 -2. 11" ~ 0.180 0.434 
-7 0.075 o. 182 -2. 1,.. 0.075 0.58~ 
-6 0.074 0. 182 -2.11-• 0.074 0.466 
-5 0.075 0.182 -2. 11•• 0.075 0.598 
-4 0.054 o . 182 -2 .1 1-• 0 . 054 0.775 
-3 0.069 0.182 -2. ,,. ~ 0 . 069 1. 216 
-2 0.414 0 . 273 -1.51 0 . 414 1. 459 
-1 0. 202 0. 182 -2 . 11•· 0 .202 1 . 625 
0 -0.385 o. 182 -2.11"" -0.385 1. 649 
-0.998 0.182 -2. 11•• -0.998 2.073 
2 -1.326 0. 182 -2. 11". -1.326 2 . 360 
3 -1 . 766 0 . 000 -3.32~· - ~ . 766 2. 402 
4 
-1.973 c . 182 -2. 11"" -1.973 2. 304 
5 -1.609 0.182 -2 . ,, •• -1.609 2. 51 0 
6 -1.E10 0.273 -1.51 -1.610 2. 63 1 
7 -1 . 361 0.273 -1.51 -1 . 361 2 .853 
8 -1.269 0 . 273 -1. 51 -1.269 3 .075 
9 -1.205 0. 364 -0.90 -1.205 3 . 3 35 
10 -1.513 0 .273 -1.51 - i. 5 i 3 3 .596 
NOT ES : 
, . ' INDICATES THAT TEST STATI STIC IS SIGNIFICANT AT 5r LEVEL USING ONE TAIL TEST . 
32 
2 . •• INDICATES THAT TEST STATISTIC IS SIGNIFICANT AT 5% LEVEL USING TWO TAILS TEST. 
3. F INDICATES THAT TEST STATT!STIC IS SIGNI FICANT AT 5% LEVEL USING TWO TAILS TEST 
BUT WITH THE WRONG SIGN. 
4. DF REFERS T~ DEGREES OF FREEDOM OFT-STAT . 
5. ACCUMLAT!O~ OF AVERAGE RESIDUALS BEGINS ON THE FIRST OMTE IN THE TABLE. 
DAY AV 
- 1 ~ 
-10 
-9 
-a 
-7 
-6 
-5 
-4 
- 3 
-2 
- 1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
TABLE 8 
AVERAGE RESIDUALS FOR MATCHED STRAIGHT BONDS AROUND LBO 
ANNOUNCEMENT USING THE RAW RET MODEL 
RESID(%) PROP>O Z-STAT AV SEC RET IN % AV MKT RET 
0.000 0.000 -2. 65·- 0.000 -0.060 
0.000 0 . 000 -2.65~ 0.000 0. 180 
0.000 0 . 000 -2.65~ 0.000 0.323 
0. 198. 0. 143 - 1. 89• 0. 198 -0.009 
0.000 0 . 000 -2.65• 0.000 -c. 265 
-0.059 0.000 -2 .65• -0.059 -0. 013 
0.000 0.000 -2.65• 0.000 -0 . 03 1 
0.000 0 . 000 -2.65• 0 .000 0.036 
-0 . 040 0 . 000 -2.65• -0.040 o. 120 
0 . 357 0 .286 - 1. 13 0 .357 0 . 146 
-0.462 0.000 -2 . 65~ - 0. 462 0 . 107 
-0.032 0.000 -2.65• -0 . 032 -0 . 461 
-0.963 0. 143 -1 .89 - 0 .963 0.235 
-0 . 225 0. 143 -1.89 -0.225 -0.052 
-0 . 651 0.000 -2 . 65~· -0.651 -o. 311 
-0 . 083 0 . 000 -2.65•• - 0 .083 -0.281 
0 . 340 0 . 286 - 1. 13 0.340 - 0.209 
-0.08 :2 0 . 143 -1 .89 -0.082 - 0 . 211 
0 .059 0. 143 - 1.89 0 .059 0 . 093 
0 . 022 0. 143 -1.89 0.022 - 0 .093 
0.039 0 . 14 3 -, . 89 0.039 0.545 
-0.489 0.000 - 2.65•• -0 . 489 0. 311 
AVERAGE STA NDARD DEVIATION N T-STAT 
COMPARISON 
PERIOD 0 .046 0.13 10 
EVENT PERIOD -0.247 0 . 304 2 -2.42• 
IPA -1 . 596 0.0 -1 2.034• 
NOT ES: 
IN % 
1 • IND I CATES THAT TEST STATISTIC IS SIGNIFICANT AT 5% LEV EL USI NG ON E 
TAIL TEST . 
2 . •• INDICATES THAT TEST STATISTIC !S SIGNIFICANT AT 5% LEVE L USI NG TWO 
TAILS TEST . 
3 . g INDICATES THAT TEST STATTISTIC IS SIGN!riCANT AT 5% LEV EL USI NG TWO 
TAILS TE ST BUT WITH THE WRONG SIGN. 
4. DF REFERS TO DEGREES OF FRE EDOM OFT-STA T. 
5 . N REF:RS TO TOTAL NUMBER OF SECURITIES EXPERIE NCING THE EVENT . 
33 
TABLE 9 
CUMULATIVE AVERAGE RESIDUALS FOR MATCHED STRAIGHT BONDS AROUND 
ANNOUNCEMENT USING THE RAW RET MODEL 
DAY CAR IN % PROP>O Z-STAT CAR SEC IN % CAR MKT IN 
-11 0.000 0.000 -2.65~· 0 .000 -0 . 060 
-10 0 . 000 0 . 000 -2.65·· 0.000 0 .120 
-9 0.000 0.000 -2.65·· 0.000 0 . 4 4 3 
-8 0 . 198 0. 143 -1.89 0 . 198 0 . 434 
-7 0 . 198 0 . 143 -1 . 89 0 . 198 0 . 16 9 
-6 0 . 139 0 .1 43 -1.89 0.139 0 . 15 6 
-5 0.139 0 . 143 -1 . 89 o. 139 0. 124 
-4 o. 139 0 . 1.:!3 - 1 . 89 c . 139 0 . 16 0 
-3 0.098 c. 143 -1 .89 0 . 098 0.28 0 
-2 0.455 0 . 286 -1. 13 0.455 0 . 4 26 
-1 -0 . 007 0 . 143 -1.89 -0.007 0.53 3 
0 -0 . 039 0 . 143 -1 . 89 - 0 .039 0 . 07 2 
1 - 1 .002 o . 143 -1 . 89 - 1 .002 0 . 3 07 
2 -1 . 227 0 . 143 -1 . 89 - 1 .227 0 . 255 
3 -1.878 0 . 000 -2 . 65·· - 1 .878 -0 . 056 
4 
-1.96 1 0.000 -2.65·· -1 . 961 - 0. 33 7 
5 -1.621 0.000 -2.65•• - 1. 621 -0 . 546 
6 -1.703 0.143 -1.89 -1.703 -0.757 
7 -1.64 .l 0. 143 -1.89 -1.644 -0 . 664 
8 -1 . 622 o. 143 -1.89 -1.622 -0 . 757 
9 -1.584 0 . 286 -1 . 13 -1 .584 - 0 . 212 
10 -2 . 073 0 . 143 - 1. 89 - 2 .073 0 .098 
NOT:CS : 
1. • INDICATES THAT TEST STATISTIC I S SI GNIFI CANT AT 5% LEV EL 
USING ONE TAIL TEST. 
2. •• INDICATES THA T TEST STATI STI C IS SI GNIFICANT AT 5% LEVEL 
USING TWO TAIL TEST . 
~ . F INDICA7ES THAT TES7 STATTI STI C IS SI GNIFICANT AT 5% LEVEL 
USING TWO TAIL TEST BUT WITH THE WRONG SIGN . 
4 . OF REFERS TO DEGRE~S OF FREEDOM OF T-S TAT . 
5. ACCUMLAT ION OF AVERAGE RESIDUALS BEG I NS ON THE FIRST DAT E 
IN THE TABLE . 
3 4 
LBO 
% 
SUM OVER 
DAY TO DIIY /ILPI·I/1 IN % 
- 1 0 0.355 
T-STAT ( 0. 49 } 
OF 5 
NOTE S : 
TABLE 10 
REGRESSION Bt:TWEEN SUM OF AVERAGE RESIDUALS FOR MATCHED STRAIGI-IT BONDS AND 
SUM OF AVERA GE RESIDUALS FOR COMMON STOCKS 
USING THE RAW RET MODEL 
CORRELATION 
BET/I COEFFICIENT SST IN '1-% SSR IN Y,,Y, SSE IN %% MSSR IN '1-% MS SE 
-o. no - 0 . 513 6 . 058 1. 592 4 . 466 1 . 592 
( 
-1.34 ) ( ·-1. 34 
5 5 6 1 5 
--~-:--· · INOICIITE S THIIT TEST STATISTIC IS SI GN IFICA NT AT 5'.1. LEVEL, USING ONE TAIL lEST. 
2. •• INDICATES THAT TEST STATISTIC IS SIGNIFIC ANT Ar 5% LEVEL USING TWO TAILS TEST . 
I N Yo'/. F-STAT 
0 . 893 1 . 78 
( 1, 5) 
3 . # INDICATES THAT TEST STATTISTIC IS SIGNIFICANT AT 5% LEVEL USING TWO TAILS TEST BUT WITH THE WRONG SIGN . 
4 . OF REfERS TO DE GREES OF T- STAT OR F-STAT. 
5. X REFERS TO THE INDE PENDENT VARIABLES WHIC~ IS SUM OF AVERAGE RESIDUALS J'OR COMMON STOCKS OV ER DAYS - 1 TO 0. 
AVERAGE X IN % 
4. 9853 
w 
lJ1 
SUM OVER 
DAY TO DAY ALPHA IN % BE TA 
- 1 0 -1.709 0.023 
T-STAT ( -2.64••) ( 0. 20 
OF 5 5 
NOT ES: 
TABLE 11 
REGRESSION BETWEE N SUM OF IPA FOR MATCHED ST RAIGHT BONDS AND 
SUM OF AVE RAGE RESIDUALS FOR COMMON STOCKS 
USING THE RAW RET MODEL 
CORRELATION 
COEFFICIENT SST IN %% SSR IN %% SSE IN 'Y..% MSSR IN %')1.. 
0.089 :'1 . 546 0 . 0 28 3.518 0.028 
) ( 0. :?0 
5 6 1 5 
--1-. - . INDICATES THAT TEST STATISTIC IS SIGNIFICANT AT 5% LEVEL, USING ONE TAIL TEST . 
2. •• INDICATES THAT TEST STATISTIC IS SIGNIFICANT AT 5 % LEVEL USING TWO TAILS TEST . 
MSSE IN %% F - STAT 
0 . 704 0 . 0 4 
( 1' 5) 
3. H INDICATES THAT TEST STATTISTIC IS SIGNIFICANT AT 5% LEVEL USING TWO TAILS TEST BUT WITH T~IE WRONG SIGN. 
4 . OF REFERS TO DEGREES OFT-STAT OR F-STAT. 
5 . X REFERS TO THE INDE PENDENT VARIABLES WHICH IS SUM OF AVERAG E RESIOUIILS FOR COMMON STOCKS OV ER DAYS - 1 TO 0 . 
AVERAGE X IN % 
4 . 9853 
w 
0'1 
').7 .5 
c 25.0 
lJ 
M 
u 
L 22 . 5 
A 
T 
I 
v 20.0 
E 
A 
v 17. 5 
E 
R 
A 
r, 15 .0 
E 
R 
E' 12 . 5 
s 
I 
[) 
u 10 . 0 
A 
L 
s 
7.5 
I 
N 
'j(. 5 .0 
2 . 5 
0 . 0 
CUMULATIV E AV ERAGE RES IOt iALS FOR COMMON STOCKS US I NG THE MARKET MODEL 
PLOT OF CA R ' OA Y SYMBOL US ED I S • 
I 
+ 
I 
+ 
I " 
+ 
I 
+ 
I 
4 
I ...... • 
~ ... ... t 
I ... :+: t · • t 
+ • • • 
I • 't ..... i • • 
• • 
+ 
I t • 
I· t t 
I " 
.. 
I 
+ • 
I . • 
i ' 
+ --- · - ~ -~ - 1· - ·---- - ----- -- - -- - -- - - - -- - - -- - --- ------ - - - - --- -- ------ - - - --- -- ------- -- ---- - ------ -- ----- - --
I 
"t t i" • .. t' t· • - ... .. 
.. 
"rj 
H 
C) 
~ 
t:<J 
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-- ~ - ---- + - --- - ~ - --- - + -- -- - + ----- +- ---- + - -- - - + - --- - -~ - --- - ~- - -·- --+ ---- - -~-- - -- - 1· ----- ~-- ----~- ---- - - -~- - -- - + --- -- +- -- --+ -- -- - +- - - - -+-
- 5 0 -47 - 4 ·1 -4 I - 38 - 3 5 -3 2 -29 -?6 ·- 23 - ').0 -I 7 - 111 - 11 -8 -5 -2 4 7 tO 
EV ENT DAYS 
i.JJ 
-..,J 
CUMULATIVE AVERAGE RETURNS FOR COMMON STOCKS . 
PLOT OF CASR ' DAY SYMBOL USED IS t 
PLOT Or- CAMR'DAY SYMBOL USE'O IS + 
I 
33 + 
c I I . + ·t 
u 30 + + • . ~ 
M 
I u L 
A 27 + 
T 
I I v 
E 24 + 
A I v 
E 21 + 
R 
I 1\ G 
E 18 + 
I 
:t: .... "%j 
H 
s t • GJ w 
T i · ... c:: ro 
::0 0 15 + • • tx:l 
c: ,. • • ~ 
K w 
• . • • 
R 12 + • • 
E 
I 
. t . • 
T . . . 
u 
R 9 + 
N 
I s . . . 
I 6 + 
N 
I % .. 
3 + I . . . + + + + + + • + + + • ~ • 
0 + -- :-·-· - ·-:_: _ :_~-~ - ~-~-+ - + - + - +-+-•-+-+-+ - + -+ -+ -+ -+ - +- ~- ~ -~-~-~-~ - ~ - ~ -~-~ - ~ - ~-~ - ~ -~ - ~ -: .. :_:_:_:_: ____ _ , ___ ____ _______ ____ ___ _ _ 
-- -+---- -+ -----+-- ---+- --- -+---- -· --- --+-- ---+--- --+--- --+-----+- ----+--- --+-----+-----+-----· ---- -+---- -+- ----+-----+ ---- -+ ---
-50 - 4 7 - 44 - 4 1 -:18 - 35 - 32 - /9 - 26 - 23 -20 - 17 - 1 t1 - I f -0 - 5 - 2 4 7 10 
EV ENT DAYS 
c 
u 
M 
u 
L 
II 
T 
r 
v 
E 
II 
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E 
R 
A 
G 
E 
R 
E 
s 
J 
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u 
A 
L 
s 
r 
N 
% 
CUMULATIV E AVERAGE RESIDUALS FOR STRAIGHT BONDS US I NG THE RIIW RETURN MODEL 
PLOT OF CAR• DAV SYMBO L USED I S * 
I 
0. 75 + 
I 
0.50 + 
I 
0. 2 5 + 
I * ., ~ ~ 
0.00 i------ --•------- --------------------- ------- -------------------
• 
-0 . 2 5 + 
I • 
- 0.50 + 
I 
- 0 . 75 + 
I 
-1.00 + • 
I 
- 1 . 25 + 
I 
- 1.50 + 
I 
- 1 . 75 + 
I 
• 
• 
~ 
":! 
H 
0 
c: 
::0 
txl 
..,.. 
-2.00 + • 
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-- - --- - - -+ - - - - + - -- - + --- - + - - -- +----+-- - - +- --- +-- --+--- - + - ---+----+- - --+-- -- ~ ----+ - ---+ ----· --- -+-- --+- -- - +--- -+----+---- - -- -
- 11 - 10 -9 - 8 - 7 - 6 - 5 -4 - 3 - 2 - 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 G 7 8 9 10 
EVENT DIIYS 
w 
1.0 
c 
u 
M 
u 
L 
A 
T 
I 
v 
E 
A 
v 
E 
R 
A 
G 
E 
B 
0 
N 
D 
R 
E 
T 
u 
R 
N 
s 
I 
N 
Yo 
3.5 + 
I 
3.0 + 
I 
2.5 + 
I 
2.0 + 
I 
I. 5 + 
I 
I .0 + 
I 
0.5 + 
I + + 
CUMULATIVE AVERAGE RESIDUALS FOR STRAIGHT BONDS USING THE RAW RETURN MODEL 
+ + 
+ 
+ 
• .. .. 
PLOT OF CASR•DAY 
PLOT OF CAMR•DAV 
+ 
+ 
+ 
• 
+ 
S YMBOL USED IS • 
SYMBOL USED IS + 
+ + 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0 .0 +--------~----* ----- ------------------------•------ - ----- - -- ----
1 
+ • 
• 
-0.5 + 
I 
-1 .0 + • 
I " 
-I. 5 + 
I " . • 
-2 . 0 + 
I 
+ 
+ 
+ 
* .. 
+ 
• 
"rj 
H 
0 
~ 
tx:1 
U1 
-- -- -- ---+--- -+- ---+- ---+--- -+-- - -+- - - -+- - --+----+----+----+----+- - - -+----+----+- -- -+ - - - -+- - - -+-- - -+- ---+- ---+ ----+----- - -- -
-11 - 10 -9 -B -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 - t 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 B 9 10 
EVE NT DAY S 
•~'> 
0 
MAJOR CHARACTERST ICS Of THE SAMPLE (IN MILI.IONS Of DOLLARS) 
OBS NAME MKTVAL TASST REV tH CLB LTDB CLA LTDA 
I CONT GRP INC 2750 . 0 3653.00 4819.50 199 .2 
2 RHEEM MFG CO 1251 . 0 
3 METROMEDIA 1130.0 1310 . 00 53?. . 70 102 . I 237 . 0 00 6!>3.000 
4 WOMETCO ENr INC 977.4 519.60 30.8 89 . 9 00 16 6.000 
5 ARA SER INC 882.5 1402 . 56 3056 . 50 53 . 6 4 11 . 374 310 . 119 462 .000 1075. 00 
6 DR PEPPER 627 . 0 560.40 21.5 
7 MALONE HYDE 580 . 0 467 . 95 2601.30 34 . 0 85.00 
8 CONOCO 500 . 0 
9 BLUE BELL INC 470 . 9 708 . 87 1228 . 90 47.5 288.600 73 . 000 
10 ACF IND INC 468 . 7 1173 . 06 583 . 70 1 . 8 150 . 000 408 . 000 
11 HA RTE HANKS 457 . 0 485. 16 443.60 33 . 3 6 2 . 400 141 . 0 00 78 . 967 738.93 
12 AMSTAR 438 . 6 604 . 66 1191.10 22 . 3 109 . 000 44.500 125 . 000 43 . 00 
13 CONE MILLS 385 . 0 687.70 8 . 7 137.000 4 . 870 
14 KAISE R STEEL 37 4. 4 1057 . 40 734.90 2.6 234 . 75 4 102 .972 117.956 75. 07 
15 BROOKS FASH 368 . 3 90 . 55 336 . 30 23 . 5 
16 COLE NI\TNL CORP 312.4 300 . 30 617.20 17.6 
17 TJCOR 27 1. 3 533.70 12 . 4 88.200 65.50 
18 STORER COMN 1496 . 7 " 1242 . 24 536 . 80 -16 . 7 134 . 994 785 . 095 134 . 000 626 .00 
.,. 19 NORTHWEST IND 1158 . 5 1525.20 1431 . 90 77.5 270 . 5 00 4 18 . 8 00 I--' :J> 20 SFN COS INC 424 . 5 328 . 40 324. 10 28 . 7 142 .000 289 . 0 00 390 .000 41 7 .00 '"d 
21 LEVITZ FURN 318 . I 46 . 80 644 . 40 27 . 4 13 .504 7 . 162 '"d 
22 GUARDI AN IND 300 . 0 502 . 56 464 . 80 38. 1 84 . 100 121 . 000 69 . 700 468. 00 tTl z 23 SCOTT FETZER 500 . 0 4 6 8 . 08 629.50 32.2 173 . 726 33.333 0 
24 NI\TL MED CARE 351 . 6 1883 . 00 H 
25 ROYAL CROWN 237. 1 251 . 44 490.06 14.9 :X: 
26 RAYMOND INTL 165.0 :J> 
27 DILLINGHAM CORP 350 . 0 1487 . 30 20 . 9 293 . 000 100 . 000 
28 LYKES BRS SS CO 150 . 0 413.00 
29 CCI CORP 100 . 0 336 . 6 0 19 .2 34 . 100 47 . 500 35 . 600 107 . 00 
30 DORCHESTER GAS 391 . 5 525 . 31 130 . 439 44.776 
3 I ALBANY INTL 270 . 4 332.60 16 . 2 46.000 57.600 
32 T I -CARD 190.8 196.52 35.395 20 . 680 
33 DAN RIVER INC 129.6 
SIMPLE UNIVARIAlE STATISTI C FO R ALL VI\RIABLE S I N DATASET 
VARII\BLE LABEL N MEliN STArJDI\RD MINIMUM MAXIMUM STD ERROR SUM 
DEV IATION VfiLUE VALUE OF MEAN 
MKTVAL MARKET VALUE OF BUYOUT 38 563.363 1579 492 . 5746421 100.0000000 2750.000000 79 . 906 1585 21407 . 80000 
TASST TOTAL ASSETS OF BOUGHT COMPANY 23 884.8310435 794 .22115464 46.8810000 3653 .00 0000 165.607265 9 20351 . 11400 
REV REVENUE S OF BOUGHT COMPANY 28 1025.5128571 10 17 . 3830348 324 . 1000000 4819.500000 192 . 26732 13 2871 4 . 36000 
NI NET INCOME OF BOUGHT COMPANY 27 36.5407407 40 . 9765811 - 16.7000000 199.200000 7 . 8 859467 986 . 60000 
CLB CURRENT LIAB BEFORE BUYOUT 22 164.2175455 11 5 . 68540211 13 . 50<1 0000 419 . 000000 24.6642107 361 2 . 78600 
LTDB LONG TERM DEBT BEFORE BUYOUT 23 189 . 0113913 207 . ·411 15853 4 . 8700000 785 . 095000 4 3.25115606 434 7.26200 
CLA CURRENT LIABILITIES AFTER BUYOUT R 176.6528750 158 . 4523133 35 . 6000000 462.000000 56.0213526 1413. 22300 
L.TOA LONG TE RM DEBT AFTER BUYOUT 10 370 . 0500000 357.0730?.00 •1 3 . 0000000 1075 . 000000 112 . 9 16403 •1 3700 . 50000 
APPENDIX B 
MAJOR CHARACTERSTICS OF THE riRMS IN THE SAMPLE 
OBS NAME CUSIP I PERM /\DATE 
1 CONT GRP INC 21145210 11447 07 - 0 2 - 84 
2 RHEEM MFG CO 76203390 21813 O!:l-24-84 
3 METROMEDIA 59169010 28580 02-01-84 
4 WOMETCO ENT INC 97816510 42227 03-30-84 
5 ARA SER INC 00204010 39271 07-13-84 
6 DR PEPPER 25612910 22648 11-18-83 
7 MALONE HYDE 56128010 52441 06-12-81 
8 CONOCO 20825110 11471 10-19-83 
9 BLUE BELL INC 09529310 44273 07-25- 8 4 
10 ACF IND INC 00080010 10006 04-18- 8 4 
11 HARTE HANKS 41619410 56389 03-28-8 4 
12 AMSTAR 03217210 10479 09-29-8 3 
13 CONE MILLS 20681310 24707 11-29- 8 3 
14 KAISER STEEL 48309810 59758 10-03-83 
15 BROOKS FASH 11439410 6 5517 08-07-84 
16 COLE NATNL CORP 19328810 43000 06-05-84 
17 TICOR 88634810 49760 10-03-83 
18 STORER COMN Fl6213110 25611 05 -06·85 
19 NORTHWEST IND 66752810 21995 04 -10- 85 
20 SFN COS INC 78415010 40723 10-02-84 
21 LEVITZ FURN 52748020 47335 04 --04-84 
22 GUARDIAN IND 40137010 48880 08 -22 - 84 
23 SCOTT FETZER 80936710 46543 04- 16-84 
24 NATL MEO CARE 63688210 58456 08 -07-84 
25 ROYAL CROWN 78024010 21303 02-17-84 
26 RAYMOND INTL 75472110 27406 05-06-83 
27 DILLINGHAM CORP 25411110 45989 01-10-83 
28 LYKES BRS SS CD 55089010 26569 11-15-82 
29 CCI CORP 12488410 300 74 11 - 16-82 
30 DORCHESTER GAS 25819810 61110 01 -26 -84 
31 ALBANY INTL 01234710 57998 04-14 - 83 
32 TI - CARO 88629610 61874 01-26 - 8 4 
33 DAN RIVER INC ?.3577310 25689 01-05-83 
CUSIP 
IPERM 
AD ATE 
DLDATE 
******** 
CUSIP numer of company on t he CRSP tape 
IPERM number of company on the CRSP tape 
The announcement date of the LBO offer 
The delisting date of the company on the 
NYSE or ASE 
Company trading on NYSE or ASE as of 
December 31, 1985 
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DLDATE 
11-02-84 
11-14 - 68 
06 - 22-84 
04-13-84 
12-20-84 
02-29-84 
07 -13 - 8 4 
1o- ot"-91 
11-28-84 
06-29-84 
09-12-84 
02-09-84 
03 - 20-84 
03-01-84 
11·-01-84 
0 9 -18-84 
07-30-79 
12-06 -85 
013-01 -85 
02-04-85 
04-11-84 
02- 22 -85 
-.r++- :<t:P t:7 .... 
12-21-84 
07-02-84 
11-17-83 
03-1F!-83 
12-06-78 
01-21-83 
08- 24-84 
00 - 0 4-8 3 
05-07 - 8 4 
05 - ?.5-83 
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